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Taking the Employer's Gun and Bargaining About
Returning It: A Reply to "A Law, Economics, and
Negotiations Approach" to Striker Replacement
Law
WILLIAM R. CORBETr*
"Youjust shot an unarmed man."
"Well, he should've armed himself ..... 1
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF STRIKER REPLACEMENT LAW
Since 1938, the law governing replacement of striking employees has
permitted employers to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers.
This rule, known as the Mackay doctrine, 2 is one of the most vehemently
debated of all labor law principles. 3 Opponents of the Mackay doctrine argue
that it renders the statutory right to strike ineffective because striking
employees' jobs are placed in jeopardy. 4 The Workplace Fairness Act, 5 which
died as a result of a Republican-led filibuster and the failure of efforts to invoke
cloture in the United States Senate in July 1994,6 was the latest failed attempt
to overturn Mackay legislatively. Other proposed legislation to overturn or
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2 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
3 See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 393 (1984) ("[Flew rules of
American labor law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike
replacements. ").
4 See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic
Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 574 ("[Mackay] has taken on a life of its own, ultimately
to eclipse the statutory right it was intended to balance."); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio:
Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 300 (1991) (asserting that Mackay "makes
a mockery of the supposed right to strike").
5 S. 55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House version was the Cesar Chavez
Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6 Defeat of Striker Replacement Bill a Victory for Business Coalition, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 133 (July 14, 1994).
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modify Mackay has been considered by Congress every year since 1988.7
. With the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act and the election of a
Republican majority to both houses of Congress in November 1994, it
appeared that no modification of striker replacement law was likely in the
immediate future. This is an area of the law, however, in which organized
labor is tenaciously committed to reform and in which business is perhaps
equally committed to preserving the status quo. Unable to have legislation
passed to prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements, organized labor won a
smaller victory on a different front.
On March 8, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,954,
"Ensuring the Economical and Efficient Administration and Completion of
Federal Government Contracts." 8 The Executive Order states that the policy of
7 See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 813, 827 n.74 (1994).
8 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). President Clinton's up-and-
down relationship with organized labor has been closely tied to his position on, and efforts
relating to, the striker replacement issue. It might be said that Executive Order 12,954 is an
effort to honor commitments Mr. Clinton made to organized labor as a presidential
candidate and as President. The legislative overturning of Mackay was a significant issue in
the 1992 presidential campaign. On April 8, 1992, Governor Clinton, then the front-runner
for the Democratic nomination, appeared on the picket lines in Peoria, Illinois at one of the
most highly publicized strikes in recent times-the United Auto Workers' strike of
Caterpillar-and announced his support of the strikers. Cynthia Todd, Clinton Backs
Strikers'Rights, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 1992, at Al. Organized labor endorsed
the Clinton candidacy. Less than one year after President Clinton took office, relations
between the President and organized labor became strained. The President lobbied hard for
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which labor opposed. After passage
of NAFTA, many labor leaders expressed their disappointment in the President. See Labor
Berates Clinton over NAFTA, Seems Cool Toward Reconciliation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 222 (Nov. 19, 1993). Some labor leaders suggested that President Clinton's best
opportunity to assuage them would be to lobby as hard for passage of the Workplace
Fairness Act as he had for NAFTA. See Organized Labor Launches New Effort for Passage
of Striker Replacement Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51 (Mar. 17, 1994); UAW
President Bieber Suggests Clinton Rebuild Relations by Backing Striker Replacement Bill,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233 (Dec. 7, 1993). President Clinton reiterated his support for
the Workplace Fairness Act. See, e.g., Aide Reaffirms Clinton Support for Workplace
Fairness Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 73 (Apr. 18, 1994). Indeed, Labor Secretary
Robert Reich on occasions assured organized labor that the Clinton administration would
obtain passage of the bill. Unions Must Make Labor Law Reform Issue in Congressional
Elections, Donahue Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93 (May 17, 1994). As discussed
above, the bill died in the Senate. Some labor leaders suggested that President Clinton did
not work very hard to get the votes to break the filibuster in the Senate-certainly not as
hard as he had worked for passage of NAFTA. See Health Care Battle Likely to Unite
Industry for Battle over Comprehensive Job Safety Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29
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the executive branch in procuring goods and services is that "contracting
agencies shall not contract with employers that permanently replace lawfully
striking employees." 9 The Order authorizes the Secretary of Labor10 to
investigate federal contractors to determine whether they have permanently
replaced lawful strikers.11 If the Secretary determines that a contractor has
hired permanent replacements, then the Secretary may exercise either or both
of the following options: find that it is appropriate to terminate existing
contracts for convenience; and find that it is appropriate to debar the contractor
from future contracts and renewal of existing contracts until resolution of the
labor dispute. 12
The business camp did not sit idly by as part of its victory in Congress
slipped away via executive order. First, Republicans in the Senate attempted to
block implementation of the Executive Order by amending a Defense
Department supplemental appropriations bill. Ironically, in a congressional
battle reminiscent of the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act, the legislative
effort to defeat the Executive Order was thwarted by a Democrat-led filibuster,
which forced withdrawal of the proposed amendment when the supporters of
the legislation fell two votes short of invoking cloture.13
Failing to defeat the Executive Order in Congress, a business coalition that
very day filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking a temporary injunction and declaratory relief prohibiting the
(Feb. 14, 1994); Unions: Trwnka Says to Leadersho of AFL-CIO It's Tine to "Either Lead
or Follow,"M Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 62 (Mar. 31, 1995). President Clinton's issuance
of Executive Order 12,954 is perhaps, in part, an effort to repair damaged relations with
organized labor resulting from the defeat of the Workplace Fairness Act. See Auto Workers:
ainton Tells Union Delegates He Wil Fight Repeal of Executive Order, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 113 (June 13, 1995).
9 Exec. Order No. 12,954, § 1, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023.
10 The Secretary of Labor delegated his authority under the Order to the Assistant
Secretary for the American Workplace. See. Order No. 2-95, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,602 (1995).
11 Exec. Order No. 12,954, § 2, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023. The Order and regulations
promulgated thereunder apply only to federal contracts in excess of one hundred thousand
dollars. Permanent Replacement of Lawfully Striking Employees by Federal Contractors,
60 Fed. Reg. 27,855, 27,861 (1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. ch. II and pt. 270)
[hereinafter Permanent Replacement].
12 Exec. Order No. 12,954, §§ 3-4, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023-24; Permanent
Replacement, supra note 11, §§ 270.12 (authorizing the Secretary to find that debarment or
termination for convenience is appropriate), 270.14 (setting out procedures for termination
of contract for convenience), 270.15 (setting out procedures for debarment).
13 Stiker Replacements: Senate Democrats Keep Cinton Order Alive;
Bridgestone/lFirestone Seeks Relief in Court, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 51 (Mar. 16,
1995).
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administration or enforcement of the Executive Order. 14 In May 1995, the
court ruled that the case was not ripe for review and that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that they were entitled to a preliminary injunction to avoid irreparable
harm.15 The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied the appellants' motion to stay enforcement of the Executive
Order but agreed to expedite the appeal. 16 The appellate court then reversed the
district court's order and remanded the case for expedited review.17 With the
judicial challenge to the Executive Order resuscitated, the Labor Department
initiated an investigation of one of the plaintiffs in the litigation-
Bridgestone/Firestone, 18 which hired a reported 2300 replacement workers for
employees participating in a United Rubber Workers' strike. 19 The Department
later was enjoined, however, from enforcing the Executive Order. On remand
of Chamber of Commerce v. Reich from the court of appeals, the district court,
although holding that the plaintiffs' challenge of the Executive Order failed,
concluded that an injunction against enforcement was warranted pending appeal
of the district court's decision.20 The Department of Labor's subsequent motion
14 Id.
15 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 886 F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C.) (order denying
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and for summary judgment and granting
defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment), rev'd, 57 F.3d
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1995).16 Rech, 57 F.3d at 1100.
17 Id. at 1101. The court held that the case satisfied the two-pronged test for ripeness
established in Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The court held that the case
satisfied the fitness requirement because it involved "purely legal questions," the Secretary
of Labor had promulgated final regulations under the Executive Order after the district
court issued its order dismissing the case, and regardless of whether the Order and
regulations ultimately result in the termination of any contracts or debarment of any
contractors, the "existence of the Order alters the balance of bargaining power between
employers and employees." Id. at 1100. The court elaborated on this last point in its
discussion of the second prong-hardship: "mThe Order confronts employers with the
difficult choice between surrendering their right to hire permanent replacements and risking
the loss of current and future government contracts." Id. at 1101.
18 Letter from Charles Richards, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the American
Workplace, to Masatoshi Ono, Chief Executive Officer of Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (June
26, 1995); see also Defendant's Supplemental Filing, Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 886
F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 95-0503) (filing of final regulations and submission of
letter sent to Bridgestone/Firestone). The letter and supplemental filing are reprinted in
Labor Dept. Letter, Court Papers on Bridgestone/Firestone Dispute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 125 (June 29, 1995).
19 Stiker Replacement: Bridgestone Said Example of Company that Executive Order
CouldAffect, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46 (March 9, 1995).
20 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 897 F. Supp. 570 (D.D.C. 1995). The court first
held that the President's issuance of the Executive Order was not subject to judicial review
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to vacate the injunction proved unavailing, as the district court held that it
lacked jurisdiction because a notice of appeal had been filed.2 1
While the judicial challenge to the Executive Order remained alive, a
further legislative effort to thwart enforcement failed. On September 28, 1995,
Democrats again employed the filibuster22 to prevent a vote on the Senate floor
on the Labor Department's 1996 spending bill, which had a rider attached that
would have prohibited the Department from expending funds to implement the
Executive Order.3 Thus, while the battle over Executive Order 12,954 appears
to be over on the legislative front, it continues in the judicial arena, where it
eventually may be decided by the Supreme Court.
Regardless of the outcome of the challenge to the Executive Order, the
recent battles between organized labor and business over permanent
replacement of strikers indicate that the war is not over. The near passage of
the Workplace Fairness Act in 1994, and the issuance of Executive Order
12,954 in 1995, suggest that no matter how hard the business camp fights to
preserve the Mackay doctrine, it will not be preserved inviolate. Many
commentators have proposed reforms of striker replacement law that fall
somewhere along the spectrum between a ban on hiring of permanent
replacements (a complete reversal of Mackay) and an unyielding preservation of
Mackay.24
under Dalton v. Spector, 114 S. Ct. 1719 (1994). Reich, 897 F. Supp. at 574-77.
Acknowledging that the parameters of Dalton are not yet defined and that the case before it
was likely to go to the Supreme Court, the district court went on to address the merits of the
legal issues and to decide the case in favor of the defendant. Id. at 573, 576-77. On the
merits, the district court first held that the Executive Order was authorized under the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1988).
Reich, 987 F. Supp. at 577-81. The court then held that that Executive Order was not
subject to the preemption doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 581-84.
After deciding that under Dalton the case must be dismissed, the court turned to the issue of
an injunction pending appeal. Focusing on the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence
of an injunction, the court quoted from the court of appeals' decision regarding the dilemma
enforcement would present plaintiffs of surrendering the right to hire permanent
replacements or risking the loss of government contracts. l at 585. Accordingly, the court
granted an injunction pending appeal of its decision. Ild.2 1 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2269 (D.D.C. 1995).
22 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23 Striker Replacements: Senate Democrats Block Labor, HS Bill, Demonstrating
Supportfor Striker Order, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189 (Sept. 29, 1995).
2 4 E.g., Corbett, supra note 7, at 886-95; Charles B. Craver, The National Labor
Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 AIz. L. Ray. 397,
423 (1992); Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or "Collective Begging"?: Reflections
on Antstiikebreaker Legislation, 93 MIc. L. REv. 577, 601-08 (1994); Douglas E. Ray,
Som Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement ssue, 41 KAN. L. REV. 363, 400
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One of the most recent entries among the proposals to reform striker
replacement law is that of Professors Leonard Bierman and Rafael Gely. They
recommend overturning Mackay, initially prohibiting employers from hiring
permanent replacements, and making that issue a mandatory bargaining topic.25
It may seem ironic to speak of weapons and shootings in a reply to Bierman
and Gely's proposal to resolve the volatile issue of striker replacement through
collective bargaining. There are two reasons why I use such terms, however.
First, Bierman and Gely's proposal is not just about resolving the permanent
replacement of strikers through bargaining; it begins by taking the employer's
principal economic weapon and allowing the union to keep its own weapon.
Second, war and battle terminology has long provided the metaphors of choice
to describe disagreements between employers and organized labor under the
National Labor Relations Act.26 With that preface, I begin with an allegorical
rendering of Bierman and Gely's proposal and my objections to it.27
II. TAKING THE EMPLOYER'S GUN AND PUTrING IT ON THE TABLE: AN
ALLEGORY
The Sheriff has been in town for some time and has seen a number of
bloody gunfights between the two old gunslingers, Employer and Union.28 He
(1992); George S. Roukis & Mamdouh L Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent
Striker Replacement Strategy, 44 LAB. L. 1. 80, 89-91 (1993); Deborah Eberts, Comment,
The Mackay Doctrine: The Grand Dame of Labor Law Caashes with the Current State of the
Union, 57 1. AIR L. & CoM. 257 (1991); Hal K. Gillespie, Comment, The Mackay
Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782, 782-87 (1972); John G.
McDonald, Note, Leveling the Playing Field or 7pping the Scales? Pending Strike
Legislation: The Latest Battlefield Between Labor and Management-An Alternative
Solution, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 971, 991-94 (1991); Note, One Strike and You're Out?
Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 670
(1993) [hereinafter Note, One Strike]; Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike: A Critique
and a Proposal for Otange, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 988, 1009-11 (1971).
25 Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and
Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363 (1995).
26 See, e.g., DouGLAs L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS
AND POLICY ch. 3 (3d ed. 1992) (Chapter three is entitled "Economic Weapons"); Julius G.
Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example,
102 YALE L.. 1803, 1825 (1993) ("The modem strike is often described as industrial
warfare. The modem strike, like modem warfare, is likely to involve many battles and a
variety of theaters of operation.").
27 Characteristic of the genre, this allegory oversimplifies the issues, but it is a useful
beginning point in this critique of Bierman and Gely's proposal.
28 1 borrow the gun metaphor for the employer's Mackay right to hire permanent
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decides that something has to be done to end the bloodshed. He steps between
Union and Employer and tells Employer to hand over his gun. Employer looks
stunned. "Is he going to turn his29 in, too?" Employer asks, pointing at Union.
"No, he isn't," responds the Sheriff.
"Then why should I turn mine in? Don't you think he'll shoot me if he has
a gun and I don't?" snorts Employer as he clutches the handle of his six-
shooter.
"No, Union will not shoot you if you turn in your gun. You're going to
have to turn it in. Union thinks you shoot his people ° too often when they
shoot at you," explains the Sheriff.
"I don't see how I can be sure he won't shoot me if I turn in my gun,"
protests Employer.
"Oh, didn't I mention that you may get your gun back? After you turn it
in, we're going to put it on this table, and you and Union are going to sit down
and bargain about whether Union will give it back to you," explains the
Sheriff.
Employer laughs aloud. "Why would he give me my gun back?"
"He might, if you are willing to pay him enough for it," explains the
Sheriff.
"You really think he would sell me my gun back, knowing I could shoot
his people with it?" asks Employer.
"Yes, I think he might if the price were right. I'll advise him so that he
will see the wisdom of selling it back to you under certain circumstances. Now
you sit down and talk with Union!" demands the Sheriff as he pulls the six-
shooter from Employer's holster. Employer is apprehensive about bargaining
with Union without his gun, but the Sheriff has laid down the new law.
Union and Employer begin bargaining. Employer mentions that he would
replacements for economic strikers from Professor Pollitt: "What was a loaded pistol
waiting to be fired in 1938, and thereafter for a number of years, is now used with a
vengeance, and the victims are the promises of the NLRA.' Pollitt, supra note 4, at 311.
2 9 Although some may object to my calling the right to strike a gun, most would admit
that the strike is the union's principal economic weapon and it is capable of inflicting harm
on the employer. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387. For purposes of this
metaphorical rendering, I will symbolize both the employees' right to strike and the
employer's right to hire permanent replacements as guns; however, I will leave open the
question of whether the employees' right to strike is as large and as powerful a gun as the
employer's right to hire permanent replacements. For argument that the Mackay right
enables employers to inflict far greater injury on employees than the right to strike enables
employees to inflict on employers, see Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: A Labor
Union Perspective, in PRocEEixNts OF NEw YORK UNrvTmrrY 43RD ANNUAL NATiONAL
CONRENCE ON LABOR 23, 43-46 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990).
30 Union is hired by many of the townspeople to protect them from Employer.
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like to buy back his gun. The moment he says that, Union reaches down and
taps his fingers on the gun protruding from his holster. Employer wipes the
sweat from his brow, asks Union to calm down, and they continue talking.
There are several issues on which they do not agree, and each time a
disagreement develops, Union slowly, deliberately touches his holstered gun.
Employer reaches down and feels his empty holster.
Employer again asks whether Union will sell him the gun. He wants it
back very badly because he feels inexplicably vulnerable under these
circumstances. Union laughs and suggests that it will cost a lot. Employer says
he is willing to pay a lot. The Sheriff steps forward and whispers something to
Union.31 After listening to the Sheriff, Union says to Employer, "Of course, if
I sell you your gun back, I will only give you enough bullets to shoot some of
my people, and I will choose which ones you can shoot at." At that, Union's
people, who have been calmly watching their hired gun bargaining for them
until now, become visibly nervous. One of them yells, "Don't let him shoot
me, Union!" Another jumps to his feet and demands, "Don't let him shoot
me!" Still another screams, "Remember, Union, we pay you to protect us!" A
fight breaks out among Union's people.Union, annoyed by the dissension he has created in his ranks by following
the Sheriffs advice, screams back: "Sit down and shut up back there. I'm
doing the best I can. If you don't like it, sue me." 32
Employer is very worried now. The clashes among Union's people have so
agitated Union that he appears ready to go for his gun and shoot Employer in
an effort to reunify them. "Well, the ones I would need to shoot to protect
myself would be that group over there. I will pay a lot to get my gun back and
get enough bullets to shoot them," offers Employer.
The Sheriff shakes his head and steps forward and whispers something else
to Union.33 Union turns suddenly and angrily tells the Sheriff to stay out of
31 He is telling Union that he can bargain away, for the right price, the right to shoot
some of the people Union represents, but not others. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at
392 ("Tere is nothing wrong [no breach of the duty of fair representation] with having a
union negotiate a contract provision that is designed to reward the expectations of a group
of employees already within the bargaining unit, even if the union ignores the interests of
other employees within the same unit."); id. at 388 ("Our proposal will also allow the union
and the employer, themselves, to make a distinction between the skill level of their workers
32 Unions would be unlikely to lose breach of the duty of fair representation lawsuits
based on bargaining for different permanent replacement rights for different groups of
employees. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 391-93.
33 He is telling Union that these people (those with firm-specific skills) are precisely
the ones who need to be protected against Employer's opportunistic behavior. Bierman &
Gely, supra note 25, at 378-79. According to the Sheriff, Union should not bargain away
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Union's business.
How does the bargaining end? The most likely ending is that Union and
Employer cannot agree about the gun or some other matter. Union threatens to
go for his gun unless Employer agrees to his terms. "If you do, I'll .... "
stammers Employer.
"You'll do what?" laughs Union.
Employer may have some other weapon-a knife, perhaps.34 Is Employer
willing to risk a fight without his gun? Maybe. If so, Union draws his gun and
shoots Employer. Employer, wounded, reaches for his knife, if he has one.
Although the outcome of this fight depends on many things, including how
skillful Employer is with his knife and how skillful Union is with his gun,
Union probably has the advantage. Employer probably agrees to Union's
demands to save himself.
II. ANALYSIS OF "A LAW, ECONOMICS, AND NEGOTATIONS
APPROACH" TO STRIKER REPLACEMENT LAW
Professors Bierman and Gely and I agree on one major point: the current
law regarding permanent replacement of strikers should be reformed in a way
that limits employers' ability to engage in opportunistic behavior. We disagree,
however, on how that should be done. I would preserve the Mackay doctrine
but restrict it with procedural limitations. 35 In contrast, the first step in
Bierman and Gely's proposal is to overturn Mackay.
I also agree with Bierman and Gely that collective bargaining offers a way
in which the parties themselves might resolve whether the employer retains the
right to hire permanent replacements for strikers. I disagree with them,
however, that no meaningful bargaining can take place on that issue until
Mackay is overruled and the initial entitlement is shifted. Unions and
their protection against being shot.
34 This weapon represents the hiring of temporary replacements, operating with
nonstriking bargaining unit personnel, moving supervisors to the strikers' positions, and
other steps to maintain operations during a strike. See CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL.,
OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERmNCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 51-68 (1982); Fmkin, supra note 4, at 562. Although these
weapons may enable the employer to endure a strike, they are not depicted here as guns
because they do not inflict the kind of harm on the striking employees that permanent
replacement does, and they do not endanger the future of the bargaining relationship.
35 See Corbett, supra note 7, at 886. My proposal for reform of striker replacement
law also advocates taking the gun from the employer, at least temporarily. My proposal
does not, however, leave it to the union to determine whether the employer gets the gun
back; it leaves that determination to the National Labor Relations Board, its administrative
law judges, and its regional offices. Id. at 886-95.
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employers can bargain on the issue of permanent replacement under current
law; there is nothing preventing parties from agreeing to a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement limiting or prohibiting an employer's hiring of
permanent replacements for strikers.
Bierman and Gely also argue that the law governing striker replacement
should distinguish between employees who have made firm-specific
investments and those who have not.36 Their proposal calls for unions to
differentially protect employees in collective bargaining in accordance with that
distinction. 37 Even if unions could make the distinctions as Bierman and Gely
argue, I do not think that most unions would or should adopt such a bargaining
strategy. 38
Generally, I disagree with Bierman and Gely's proposal because I think it
is theoretically unsound, and it would not function in practice as they posit.
The following sections set forth my specific disagreements with their proposal.
A. Failure to Recognize or Appreciate Significant Limitations Imposed
on Employers' Use of Permanent Replacements Under Current Law
Bierman and Gely want the law governing permanent replacement of
strikers to produce efficient results. Professors Cohen and Wachter argue that
the current law does that.39 They see the Mackay doctrine as playing a vital
role in preventing opportunistic behavior by both unions and employers. 4°
Bierman and Gely challenge them on part of this proposition, arguing that the
current law does not impose sufficient limits on opportunistic behavior by
employers. 41
While I agree with Bierman and Gely that the current law needs to be
reformed to impose more restrictions on employers' opportunistic behavior,
they fail to recognize or appreciate some of the limitations that the current law
does impose. Bierman and Gely attack Cohen and Wachter's argument that the
external labor market limits opportunistic behavior by employers because
employers will find it difficult to hire permanent replacements at below-market
wages and because replacements would be reluctant to make firm-specific
36 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 374, 378-80.
37 Id. at 383 ("[If courts or Congress make the decision of whether to hire striker
replacements a mandatory issue of bargaining, unions and employers could make the
distinction between firm-specific and general investments made by workers ... .3 8 See infra part III.D.
39 George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law
and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS oF NEw YoRK UNIVERSrY 43RD ANNuAL
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 29, at 109, 111.
40 Id. at 118.
41 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 374-78.
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investments in firms that develop a reputation for behaving opportunistically.42
Although Bierman and Gely argue persuasively on this point, they fail to
recognize or appreciate the significance of Cohen and Wachter's identification
of deterrents to employers' opportunistic behavior in not only these external
labor market checks, but also in "Court and board rulings [that] improv[e] the
likelihood of efficient outcomes." 43 Stated differently, Mackay does not
constitute all of the law on the hiring of permanent replacements for striking
employees. Although Mackay favors employers, other decisions of the
Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board favor employees by
restricting Mackay in various ways.
Cohen and Wachter discuss three Supreme Court decisions and one
National Labor Relations Board decision that limit Mackay: NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.44 (prohibiting employers from offering superseniority to strike
crossovers); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.45 and NLRB v. Laidlaw Corp.46
(enforcing the reinstatement rights of permanently replaced strikers); and NLRB
v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.47 (affirming the NLRB's decision to adopt
no presumption regarding permanent replacements' support for, or opposition
to, an incumbent union). In addition to those cases, many decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts of appeals have made it
more difficult for employers to hire permanent replacements for strikers and
retain them after the strike and to displace an incumbent union through such a
strategy. 48
42 Id. at 375; see also Note, One Stike, supra note 24, at 678 n.51 ("Wachter and
Cohen miss the fundamental point that unorganized labor, because of informational
imperfections and mobility deficiencies . . . are unable to accurately assess the true
competitive market wage rate.").
43 Cohen & Wachter, supra note 39, at 117.
44 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
45 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
46 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970).
47 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
48 Consider, for example, the following principles that favor the striking employees
and the unions by making it risky for employers to hire permanent replacements. The
burden is on the employer to prove that it has hired permanent replacements. See, e.g.,
Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290 (1993), enforcement denied in part, 53
F.3d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Ambiguity in the wording of replacement offers is construed
against the employer. See, e.g., Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), review
denied, 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 845 (1987). The most important
limitation on Mackay is that employers may hire permanent replacements for only economic
strikers; the Mackay right to hire permanent replacements does not apply to unfair labor
practice strikes. Ray, supra note 24, at 368. Unions almost always contend that strikes are
unfair labor practice strikes, and the standards for determining the characterization of a
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. There is another limitation imposed on employers' potential opportunistic
behavior by the internal labor market. The employees that Bierman and Gely
argue should be protected from permanent replacement are those who have
made investments in firm-specific training. As Bierman and Gely note, the very
characteristic that could make these employees targets of opportunistic
behavior, their firm-specific skills, also provides them protection against such
conduct. They are the employees that the employer would have the most
difficulty replacing because the replacements must be trained, and that training
involves both cost and time.49
strike favor unions and the striking employees. A strike is classified as an unfair labor
practice strike if it was "caused in whole or in part by an employer's unfair labor
practices." Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1319 (7th Cir. 1989). A strike
that begins as an economic strike is converted into an unfair labor practice strike if an
employer's unfair labor practice is a factor in prolonging the strike. See, e.g., C-Line
Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989). The Board treats some types of unfair labor
practices as resulting in per se conversion of an economic strike into an unfair labor practice
strike without even considering the subjective evidence to determine whether the striking
employees considered the unfair labor practice a cause of the strike. Id. Suppose an
employer, concluding that it lawfully could hire permanent replacements and that it in fact
has done so, denies reinstatement to striking employees who offer to return to work. If the
employer's conclusions are later determined to be incorrect by the NLRB (and perhaps a
court of appeals), the employer will be held liable for potentially large back pay and other
make-whole relief. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 848-50. See generally Dennis 0. Lynch,
Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back
Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 302 n.346 (1989) ("When a union strikes, the employer
can hire replacements and the employees may be forced to seek employment elsewhere, but
NLRA obligations create very high transaction costs which severely restrict the employer's
ability to seek employees outside of the members of the certified unit.").
4 9 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 379-80. Many other commentators have
recognized this principle. See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie, Retelling the International Paper
Story, 102 YALE LJ. 1897, 1898-99 (1993) ("Unions win strikes for a number of
reasons.... [Miost importantly, a union can win a strike if the workers possess skills and
knowledge that are specific to the firm or the industry, so that managers cannot replace
them with newcomers, at least in the short run."); see also Douglas L. Leslie, Labor
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 358 (1984) (explaining that firms may incur heavy
costs when an employee with firm-specific skills leaves the firm because costs of training a
replacement "are directly proportional to the firm-specific knowledge or skills of the exiting
employee"); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economdcs of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Cosure,
and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1358 (1988) (observing that, because workers
with job-specific training have a productivity advantage over workers without such training,
the replacement labor pool is diminished).
A corollary to the difficulty of replacing employees with firm-specific training is that
employers may most need to be able to offer permanent status in order to attract
replacements to those positions. Potential replacements may be reluctant to invest in firnm-
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Thus, Bierman and Gely underestimate the limitations imposed on
employers' right to permanently replace strikers under current law. Explaining
the inadequacy of two of the limitations identified by Cohen and Wachter is not
a full treatment of the restrictions currently imposed on the Mackay doctrine.
Although more restrictions are needed to deter opportunistic behavior by
employers, the extreme reform Bierman and Gely recommend, overruling
Mackay, is not necessary. Indeed, that first step in Bierman and Gely's
proposal brings them to the second part of Cohen and Wachter's theory on the
efficiency of the Mackay doctrine: it deters Opportunistic behavior by unions. If
Mackay were overruled, what would deter unions from the opportunistic
behavior of making demands that would impose substantial hardship on
employers and calling strikes to obtain their demands? Bierman and Gely's
failure to answer that question demonstrates why the first step in their proposal
is unwise.
B. Failure to Propose an Effective Restriction on Opportunistic Behavior
by Unions to Replace the Mackay Doctrine
Bierman and Gely recognize that overruling Mackay increases the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by unions and employees. 50 Some
commentators postulate that, if employers were prohibited from hiring
permanent replacements, unions would be quicker to call strikes,51 and,
because strikes would involve a substantially reduced risk, unions would call
strikes to obtain excessive demands. 52 If Mackay were overruled as Bierman
specific training if the job offer is for no more than the duration of a strike. On the
diminution of the substitute labor pool if employers were limited to hiring temporary
replacements, see Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert, and Carteizat'on, 34 B.C. L. REv. 257,
305 (1993).
50 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 370 ("[I1f the Mackay doctrine was overturned
and unions were given total protection against the hiring of permanent replacements,
employers might well be subject to some form of opportunistic behavior on the part of
unions."); id. at 382 ("[Tfhe American Airlines scenario also illustrates the opportunistic
leverage potentially open to unions if the Mackay doctrine is simply overturned without
more."); id. at 387 ("[I]f unions are allowed to strike knowing that their members cannot be
permanently replaced, they will be free to engage in strikes and in that way expropriate
rents due to the employer under their agreement.").
5 1 E.g., Brendan Dolan, Mackay Radio: f It Isn't Broken, Don't Fbi It, 25 U.S.F. L.
REy. 313, 317 (1991).
52 E.g., David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7
LAB. LAW. 137, 146 (1991).
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and Gely propose, what would deter unions from engaging in such
opportunistic behavior? I find no satisfactory answer in their article.
Bierman and Gely suggest that the second step of their proposal, making
permanent replacement a mandatory bargaining topic, would deter unions from
acting opportunistically. I disagree. That step would not provide employers any
protection against opportunistic behavior by unions. One consequence of an
issue being labelled a mandatory topic is that if either party wishes to bargain
about it, the parties have a duty to bargain in good faith about that topic. 53
Thus, under Bierman and Gely's proposal, an employer could insist that a
union bargain with it on the issue of permanent replacement, and the union
would be required to do so. A second ramification of a topic being classified as
a mandatory topic, however, is that either party can insist upon its position on
that issue to impasse and use economic force in support of its position.5 4 Thus,
under Bierman and Gely's proposal, a union could maintain its position on
striker replacement (or any other mandatory topic) and back it up with a strike.
Because Bierman and Gely's first step was to shift the rule and prohibit
permanent replacement, the employer could not hire permanent replacements
during such a strike. Ironically then, the second step of Bierman and Gely's
proposal, adding a contentious topic to those mandatory topics on which unions
can strike, actually could exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the increased
potential for opportunistic behavior by unions under their proposal.55
Bierman and Gely's answer to this challenge seems to be that unions will
bargain on this issue toward "mutual gain by exchange"5 6 if the initial rule is
set in their favor, whereas employers will not. It is likely that unions would
bargain about permanent replacement if it were declared a mandatory
bargaining topic; it would be an unfair labor practice to refuse to do so. The
pivotal question is whether unions would be willing to make exchanges on this
issue so that agreements could be achieved; if not, they could call strikes in
support of their position. Bierman and Gely suggest that the permanent
53 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); ROBERT
A. GORMAN, BAsIc TExr ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEcriVE BARGAiNING
498 (1976).54 GORMAN, supra note 53, at 498.
55 1 would not object to making permanent replacement a mandatory topic under the
current striker replacement law. My point is that making it a mandatory topic after
overturning Mackay would not deter unions' opportunistic behavior. I am skeptical,
however, that making striker replacement a mandatory topic under current law would
facilitate bargaining. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 278-79 (arguing that the
mandatory/permissive distinction may not practically affect the parties when bargaining for
a collective bargaining agreement).
56 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385, 393 (quoting ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 6 (1988)).
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replacement issue is more likely to be resolved by the parties themselves if the
initial rule favors the union.57 The next section explains why their argument on
this point is unpersuasive.
C. Effect on Collective Bargaining of Shifting the Default Entitlement to
Unions
Why would unions with the default entitlement58 be more likely to bargain
toward mutual exchange and agreement than employers with the default
entitlement? First, according to Bierman and Gely, unions would be more
likely to bargain to agreement because calling strikes hurts their members. 59
Second, unions value the right more than employers, and so they should be
given the opportunity to exchange it for something they value more highly. 60
Both of these propositions are dubious.
1. Effect of Strike Hardship on Willingness to Call Stikes
It is true that strikes inflict hardship on striking employees because they
forego their regular paychecks while on strike.61 It is also true that harming the
employer by striking ultimately may harm the employees who are dependent on
the employer for their financial well-being. 62 Bierman and Gely's argument
that these considerations will make unions more likely than employers to
5 7 Id. at 387-88.
58 "Default entitlements" or "default settings" is the term used by Professors Wachter
and Cohen to denote "entitlements that apply in the absence of a contrary agreement, or in
the presence of an ambiguous agreement, between contracting parties." Wachter & Cohen,
supra note 49, at 1365. Professor Leslie uses "gap-filling rule" in the same way. LESLE,
supra note 26, at 426.
5 9 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n.154. This discussion is relevant to which
party should be assigned the initial entitlement. Professors Wachter and Cohen posit that
property rule entitlements (things that can be taken only through voluntary purchases,
Wachter and Cohen, supra note 49, at 1366 n.88) are "relatively efficient" when the default
entitlement is assigned to the party that values the entitlement more or the party that is less
likely to use it strategically. Wachter & Cohen, supra note 49, at 1370. Bierman and Gely
argue that unions, which are reluctant to strike, are less likely to use the default entitlement
strategically. Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n.154.60 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387-88.
6 1 Id. at 388 n.154; see also PAUL C. WEmLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FuTuRE roF LABoR AND EMvLoYmEN LAw 129 (1990) (describing the strike as a "two-
edged sword").62 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 388 n.154; see also Kamiat, supra note 29, at
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bargain toward agreement, however, fails to take into account several
principles.
First, although strikes impose hardships on strikers under the current law,
they still are conducted. Why? Apparently unions and the employees they
represent think that the bargaining concessions an employer will make to end a
strike are greater than the hardship imposed on the employees for the duration
of the strike. If the principal impediment to strikes63 were removed, it is likely
that unions would be less reluctant to call strikes. Furthermore, although going
without a paycheck is undeniably painful, the strikers and unions would control
how long they endure the pain, as the strikers could obtain reinstatement upon
making unconditional offers to return to work, and the employer would be
required to reinstate them.64
Second, unions are not limited to either calling strikes and causing their
members to suffer or bargaiiing with employers and earnestly trying to achieve
agreements. The threat of a strike (tapping fingers on the holstered gun), with
the employer prohibited from hiring permanent replacements, might be enough
to cause an employer to shy away from its demands. 65 Unions, like employers
under the current law, could act opportunistically by using the threat of
unchecked economic force to cause employers to accede to unreasonable
demands. 66
Finally, it does not necessarily follow that, because the employees' future
economic well-being may depend on the employer, they and their union will
not make excessive demands and support them with damaging strikes. 67
Employees and unions, even if provided with information by an employer
regarding the economic harm that would result from agreeing to their demands,
may evaluate the information differently than the employer. For example, some
63 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
64 The employer would be required to reinstate them unless the employer announced a
lockout at or before the time the strikers made offers to return. Eads Transfer, Inc., 304
N.L.R.B. 711,713 (1991), enforced, 989 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1993).
65 Under the current rule on striker replacement favoring employers, some employers
use the threat of permanent replacement to exercise leverage at the bargaining table. See
Ray, supra note 24, at 365. Some employers also use the threat of hiring permanent
replacements to end strikes without ever actually hiring permanent replacements. See
CHARLES S. LouGHRAN, NEGOTIATING A LABOR CoNTRAcr: A MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK
430 (2d ed. 1992) (describing a threat to hire permanent replacements as "a powerful
incentive to motivate union negotiators to seek a settlement before or during a strike"); see
also Corbett, supra note 7, at 815-26 (describing the effect of Caterpillar's threat of
permanent replacement on the UAW's strike in 1991-92).
66 Lynch, supra note 48, at 302 (discussing both parties' use of threats and lies to gain
the terms they want).
67 Westfali, supra note 52, at 147 (asserting that a "vast leap of faith" is required to
conclude that such a realization is a sufficient deterrent).
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employees may be concerned with the financial stability and competitiveness of
the employer only in the short term, after which their own financial well-being
may no longer depend on the employer.
2. Default Entitlement-Unions or Employers?
a. Current Law Does Not Prevent Parties From Contracting Around the
Default Entitlement (But They Do Not)
Bierman and Gely observe that it is paradoxical that none of the previous
proposals to reform striker replacement law have attempted to use the collective
bargaining process. 68 An initial response is that no reform of the law is
necessary to make such a solution possible. Although Bierman and Gely are
correct that no case has decided whether permanent replacement is a permissive
or mandatory topic, 69 there is nothing in the Act or any court or Board
decision suggesting that it is an illegal topic. 70 Thus, it is at least a permissive
topic, and the parties could bargain about it if both wished to do so. 71 Yet,
employers and unions typically have not included provisions in collective
bargaining agreements prohibiting employers from hiring permanent
replacements for all the members of a collective bargaining unit or for any of
them.72 Employers have retained the initial entitlement granted by Mackay.
68 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 384.
69 Id. at 388-89.
70 There are three types of bargaining topics: mandatory, permissive, and illegal.
GORMAN, supra note 53, at 498.
71 See Lynch, supra note 48, at 291 n.292 ("The right of an employer to permanently
replace an economic striker under Mackay can be conceptually treated as an entitlement that
the employer can transfer to the union."); see also 470 Stratford Holding Co. v. Local 32B-
321, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 805 F. Supp. 118, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting
argument that employer had agreed to waive Mackay right under collective bargaining
agreement, but recognizing that "statutorily-protected right" can be waived by "clear and
unmistakable" agreement).
7 2 See 2 BuREAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRs, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACrs ch. 77 (discussing and giving examples of basic patterns for contract terms
regarding strikes and lockouts; no clause prohibiting the hiring of permanent replacements
is included).
In some cases arbitrators, even in the absence of an express provision prohibiting
employers from hiring permanent replacements, have strained to interpret collective
bargaining agreements as waiving the employer's Mackay right. See Meyers v. Parex, Inc.,
689 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming arbitrator's award interpreting collective bargaining
agreement, through interaction of three sections, as waiving the employer's right to
permanently replace striking employees without notice); Edna H. Pagel, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local Union 595, 667 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming arbitrator's award interpreting
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Why have the parties themselves not negotiated such clauses? Bierman and
Gely answer that the employer has no incentive to bargain on this issue
"because any negotiation will by definition make the employer worse off."73
Do they mean to say that employers value the right to hire permanent
replacements so highly that they are unwilling to sell it to unions at any price?
It is inconsistent for Bierman and Gely to assert that employers value the right
so much that they will not bargain about exchanging it and also to assert that
unions value the right more highly than employers, but giving them the default
entitlement will facilitate bargaining because they will be willing "to exchange
the protection against permanent replacements for other bargaining demands
they might value more highly." 74 The fact that employers do not bargain away
the initial entitlement indicates that they value the right more highly than
unions.
b. Why Should the Default Entitlement Be Shifted?
Bierman and Gely root their proposal for reforming striker replacement
law in the law and economics objective of achieving efficiency in collective
bargaining. 75 In view of that objective, they should explain why shifing the
default entitlement to unions will produce efficient results. They assert that, in
the presence of transaction costs, bargaining structure matters and the initial
allocation of rights will affect the likelihood of successful bargaining. 76 Which
party should be favored by the initial entitlement in order to facilitate
bargaining for mutual exchange and efficient results? Unions, say Bierman and
Gely. Why? Because, they assert, unions value the right more than
employers. 77 The lack of analysis supporting this assertion calls its validity into
question.
An initial assumption that Bierman and Gely make regarding application of
clause prohibiting discharge for picketing or honoring picket lines as precluding permanent
replacement of striking employees). But see 470 Stratford Holding Co., 805 F. Supp. at 126
("T]he fact that a collective bargaining agreement includes a justifiable discharge provision
in no way indicates that the employer waived his statutorily-protected right to hire
permanent replacement workers.").
73 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 387; see also id. at 393 ("[U]nder the current
scheme of things, there is almost no incentive for employers to bargain with respect to this
issue.").
74 Id. at 388.
75 See id. at 384-88 (describing the opportunity for "mutual gain by exchange"); id. at
366 (disagreeing with Wachter and Cohen on efficiency of the Mackay doctrine and styling
their proposal a "remedy [to] this problem").
76 Id. at386.
77 Id. at 387-88.
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the Coase Theorem78 to collective bargaining merits some attention. They
assume that transaction costs do affect the efficient allocation of entitlements in
collective bargaining. According to the Coase Theorem, in the absence of
transaction costs, parties will reach efficient agreements regardless of which
party has the initial entitlement. 79 When transaction costs do not affect the
efficient allocation, the initial entitlement should be allocated in accordance
with what most parties would agree to if they bargained over the issue, so that
most parties can rely upon the gap-filler and be spared whatever transaction
costs are associated with bargaining. 80 Because collective bargaining
agreements. do not shift the entitlement to the union,81 the initial entitlement
should be as it is under current law.
Bierman and Gely assert, however, that transaction costs do interfere with
the efficient allocation of entitlements in collective bargaining.82 There is
disagreement on this matter among commentators.83 If Bierman and Gely are
correct, however, the presence of transaction costs could explain why collective
bargaining agreements do not have clauses that prohibit the hiring of permanent
replacements even if, as Bierman and Gely assert, unions value the right more
highly than employers. 84 Still, one would expect to find some situations in
78 The theorem was first suggested in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).79 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385; see also CoomaR & ULEN, supra note 56,
at 101 n.11; Lynch, supra note 48, at 299; Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and
the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. Ray. 245, 246, 258 (1987).80 LIE, supra note 26, at 425.
81 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
82 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 386-87.
83 Corpare LESLIE, supra note 26, at 425 (asserting that there are "serious
transactions costs in labor-management gap-filling") with Schwab, supra note 79, at 266-68
(contending that transaction costs do not interfere with efficient allocation of entitlement
when the difference in valuation of entitlement by parties exceeds costs of bargaining, and
asserting that bargaining costs are lower in labor bargaining than in other contexts) and
Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 (arguing that transaction costs are close to zero). Professors
Wachter and Cohen describe Leslie and Schwab as "stak[ing] out polar cases in the debate
over the trading of entitlements." Wachter & Cohen, supra note 49, at 1366 n.61. Wachter
and Cohen argue, in their "middle ground" position, that the transaction costs of strategic
behavior and asymmetric behavior sometimes interfere with the efficient exchange of
entitlements, but that the parties often overcome those transaction costs and agree to
efficient contracts. Id.
84 Professor Leslie uses the term "trivial entitlement" to describe an entitlement for
which the transaction costs are greater than the gain from obtaining a contractual reversal of
the default entitlement. LESLIE, supra note 26, at 426. Leslie's further description of how
unions would seek to obtain such an entitlement could apply to organized labor's efforts to
obtain the default entitlement on permanent replacement:
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which some unions have succeeded in obtaining such clauses through
bargaining if they value the entitlement more than employers. 85
Assuming, arguendo, that Bierman and Gely are correct about transaction
costs interfering with the transfer of entitlements to parties that value them the
most, with which party, employer or union, should the law place the default
entitlement regarding permanent replacement? Bierman and Gely state the law
should do three things: (1) increase the likelihood of successful bargaining; (2)
minimize transaction costs associated with bargaining; and (3) provide adequate
enforcement mechanisms when bargaining fails. 86 Apparently guided by those
objectives, they argue that the default entitlement should be allocated to the
"union, the party which probably values this right the most." 87
Assigning the default rule to the party that values it the most is one of the
approaches advocated by commentators.88 How do Bierman and Gely conclude
that unions value the entitlement more highly than employers? They offer no
support for their conclusion. As Professor Leslie observes, identifying the
party that values the entitlement more highly "involves more than just a little
speculation": it involves identifying the benefits to the parties from engaging in
the conduct, and "the risks of unforeseen events and strategic behavior."8 9
Considering the bargaining leverage that the permanent replacement entitlement
gives to the party that has it initially9" and the potential for strategic behavior
It is consistent with the value of a gap-filling rule being trivial that there is
substantial lobbying with the Board, courts, or the legislature, for a reversal of the. rule.
The value of a particular right when summed across all [effected] unions might be
substantial, and so the AFL-CIO or [effected] international unions might do the
lobbying. Moreover, the value of a particular rule may be low because the probability
(ex ante) of its invocation is low, although once the event triggering the rule has
occurred, the (ex post) value of the rule may warrant litigation by the parties affected.
Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). Although the consequences of permanent replacement can be
devastating when actually invoked, see, e.g., Michael Arndt, Casualies Rise in Sbike War
Walkout Losers, Employers Spar over Crucial Bill, Cm. THIB., June 13, 1994, § 4, at 1, it is
rarely implemented by employers. The U.S. General Accounting Office estimates that
employers actually hired permanent replacements in about seventeen percent of the strikes
in 1985 and 1989. U.S. GEN. ACcoUNTI rIG OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS:
STRIK AND THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLAcEM S IN THE 1970s AND 1980s,
H.R. Doc. No. 2, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1991).
85 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
86 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 385.
87 Id. at 387-88 (footnote omitted).
88 LESLIE, supra note 26, at 431; Schwab, supra note 79, at 287 ("In a world of costly
transactions, efficiency is promoted by awarding an entitlement to the party who values it
most highly and would have obtained it but for the transaction costs.").
89 LESLIE, supra note 26, at 432.90 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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by that party, I think it is difficult to determine whether generally employers or
unions value the right more highly. An alternative basis for allocating the
default entitlement may prove more useful.
Another basis for selecting the initial entitlement is choosing the setting
that involves lower transaction costs. 91 Indeed, Bierman and Gely identify this
choice as one of the roles of the law in providing a framework for
negotiations. 92 Professor Leslie identifies several transaction costs relevant to
setting default entitlements in collective bargaining. 93 These transaction costs
also have been treated as part of the unions' difficulties in valuing an
entitlement and in justifying to their members an exchange of an entitlement. 94
Under either treatment, consideration of these factors suggests that shifing the
default entitlement on permanent replacement to unions would not minimize
transaction costs and increase the likelihood of successful bargaining-two of
the goals Bierman and Gely identify for their proposal. 95
Leslie uses the term "batch theory" as the name for the situation arising
out of the fact that terms in collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in
batches. 96 Because the tradeoffs involved in negotiations may be complex, it
may be difficult for unions to explain to their members what they got in
exchange for relinquishing a right initially conferred by law. 97 Because of this
problem, unions that have the default entitlement may refuse to bargain it
away.98 Consequently, it may be more costly for the parties to move from a
default rule giving the union the initial entitlement to an agreement transferring
the entitlement to the employer than vice versa.99
A second transaction cost or valuation problem, related to the first, has
been discussed as the difference in valuation of opportunity cost income and
realized income1°° and a "No Backwards Steps" strategy of unions. 10 1 The
91 LESLIE, supra note 26, at 431.
92 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 389.
93 LESLIE, supra note 26, at 425-31.
94 Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 n.335; see also Schwab, supra note 79, at 275
(discussing the effect that shifting the default entitlement has on valuation of entitlement).
95 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 389.
96 LLIE, supra note 26, at 426-28.97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 431 & n.26.
100 Lynch, supra note 48, at 300 n.335, 302-04; Schwab, supra note 79, at 275-77.
Lynch interprets Leslie's "framing theory" as describing a similar phenomenon. Lynch,
supra note 48, at 303-04 n.355. Framing theory describes individuals' risk aversion when
gains are at stake and risk preference when losses are at stake. LESLIE, supra note 26, at
429-30.
101 Schwab, supra note 79, at 277 (explaining meaning of phrase and noting that it
originated with John L. Lewis).
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phenomenon described by these terms is that employees will value an
entitlement that initially belongs to them more highly than they will value the
same entitlement if it initially belongs to the employer. 102 Consequently,
unions will charge employers more to purchase the entitlement than unions
would pay employers for that entitlement. 103 If this result is true, it suggests
that bargaining to agreement is less likely when the union has the initial
entitlement than when the employer has it. One aspect of unions as collective
bargaining representatives and two characteristics of the permanent replacement
issue suggest that the higher valuation of the initial entitlement (realized
income) will be exaggerated in the collective bargaining context, with the likely
result that most unions will not sell the entitlement for any price that employers
are likely to offer.
Union leaders must assess not their own differential valuations of realized
income and opportunity cost income, but that of the bargaining unit members
whom they represent. 1 4 Because of the difficulty of this overall assessment,
union leaders may find it politically expedient to preserve an initial entitlement
like a prohibition on permanent replacement even if that means achieving lower
gains in other terms and conditions of the agreement. 10 5
Selling the right to permanently replace strikers would diminish or
decimate the ability of a union to mount a successful strike against an
employer. Groups of employees with respect to whom a union sells an
employer the right to permanently replace are not likely to go out on strike,1' 6
nor should the union expect them to do so.
A second condition peculiar to the permanent replacement issue which is
likely to increase the union's valuation of the initial entitlement (realized
income) vis- -vis the opportunity cost income is the potential ripple effect of
selling the entitlement on future negotiations for new collective bargaining
agreements. If a union sells the entitlement, it is also, to a large extent, selling
its leverage in future negotiations. Bierman and Gely propose that any
contractual provision on permanent replacement would survive the expiration
102 Mark Kelman, Conumption Theory, Production 7heory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678-95 (1979); Lynch, supra note 48, at 303-04;
Schwab, supra note 79, at 276.
103 Lynch, supra note 48, at 303; Schwab, supra note 79, at 276.
104 Lynch, supra note 48, at 304.
105 Id.
106 One may argue that under the current law employees strike notwithstanding the
threat of permanent replacement. Employees perceive no irony, however, that unions call
on them to strike now under the threat of permanent replacement when employers have the
initial entitlement. In contrast, employees will not miss the irony of being asked to strike
under the threat of permanent replacement when the very union advising them to strike sold
their protection.
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of the collective bargaining agreement. 107 I agree with them that such a
requirement would be necessary to make the entitlement to permanently replace
something that an employer would be interested in purchasing. Most strikes
occur during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement;
consequently, the greatest value of a permanent replacement clause to an
employer would be during negotiations for a new agreement. A corollary to
this, however, is that a union trades its future leverage for a good collective
bargaining agreement in the present. Unions will not fail to recognize this
point, and the likely result is that unions will refuse to sell the entitlement to
employers at virtually any price.
In sum, Bierman and Gely's basis for setting the default entitlement on
permanent replacement in favor of unions is that unions value it more highly
than employers. They do not support that conclusion, and it would be difficult
to determine which party does value the entitlement more highly. In view of
that difficulty, it might be more useful to allocate the default entitlement
according to which setting entails lower transaction costs and promotes
bargaining. At least two significant factors suggest that shifting the initial
entitlement would not accomplish those objectives.
D. The Bargaining Strategy Advocated by Biennan and Gely
Bierman and Gely's proposal is designed to make it possible for unions to
sell the right to permanently replace strikers to employers with respect to some
employees (those with general skills) but not others (those with firm-specific
skills). Bierman and Gely recognize that situations exist in which a union
represents a bargaining unit in which there are both types of employees. l08
These situations and the bargaining strategy that Bierman and Gely recommend
as a response to these situations raise problems. 109 1 think that unions generally
107 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 390-91.
108 d. at 388 (asserting that their proposal allows employers and unions to distinguish
between skill levels of employees); id. at 391-92 (arguing that unions would not lose breach
of the duty of fair representation lawsuits as a result of negotiating agreements distinguishing
between employees with specific skills and those with general skills).
109 These problems may be addressed by including firm-specific skills and general
skills as community of interest factors in an effort to reduce or eliminate "mixed" units.
See, e.g., GORMAN, supra note 53, at 68-74 (discussing community of interest factors used
to determine what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit). Introducing more factors
about which parties can disagree prior to a representation election, however, could further
complicate unit determination and further delay employees' opportunity to be represented
by a labor organization. Cf. Remarks of NLRB Oaiman Gould to the Commonwealth Cub,
San Francisco, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 111 (June 13, 1994) (decrying wasteflulness and
delay of litigation over appropriate bargaining units and advocating adoption of more
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would not adopt the bargaining strategy for mixed units advocated by Bierman
and Gely, and further, I think that they should not do so.
1. Unions Would Not Adopt the Bargaining Strategy
First, Bierman and Gely assume that, because an employer would be acting
opportunistically by permanently replacing employees with firm-specific skills,
unions, favored with the default entitlement, necessarily would be solicitous of
protecting those employees. Although some unions might have a singular
concern for employees with firm-specific skills, unions also have self-interest
considerations that are significant in shaping their bargaining strategies. One is
that a union must retain the support of a majority of the bargaining unit
members lest it risk losing its status as the exclusive bargaining
representative.110 Furthermore, under many circumstances, bargaining unit
members are not required to pay dues and fees to a union."' Thus, a union,
deciding for which employees it would sell the right of permanent replacement
(if any), may be more concerned with self-preservation than protecting
employees with firm-specific skills.
A union's bargaining strategy also must take into account the bargaining
strategy of the employer. If the union has the default entitlement on permanent
replacement, the employer's bargaining strategy will emphasize purchasing the
right to permanently replace which employees? In order to attract replacements
who will invest in firm-specific skills, employers may find it necessary to offer
permanent status.112 Employees with general skills who can begin working
with little or no training are likely to be easier to attract, even if all that
employers can offer is temporary status. Thus, it is the very employees that
definitive rules). Furthermore, this new approach to determining bargaining units would
apply only to new bargaining units. The problems discussed below would continue to arise
for pre-existing mixed units.
110 This loss of status could occur through withdrawal of recognition by the employer,
supported by a good faith doubt in the majority status of the union, or a loss in a
decertification election or an election in response to an employer's RM petition. See
generally DOUGLAs E. RAY & EMERY W. BARTLE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS:
STRKES, LOCKoTrs AND BoYcorrs §§ 8:01-:06 (1992).
111 This option depends on whether the particular state has a right-to-work statute, and
if not, whether the collective bargaining agreement contains a union security clause. See
generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS Acr ch. 27 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
112 LeRoy, supra note 49, at 305-06 ("Particularly for employers who rely on a
skilled workforce, [a prohibition on hiring permanent replacements] would virtually cut off
the supply of qualified replacement workers: there would be no effective working through
strikes.").
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Bierman and Gely argue unions should protect for whom employers are likely
to pay a lot for the right to replace. Will unions sell employers that right? It
may depend on how much the unions can get for how many of their other
bargaining unit members.
2. Unions Should Not Adopt the Bargaining Strategy
Bierman and Gely assert that unions would not be likely to lose breach of
the duty of fair representation cases for selling the permanent replacement
protection with respect to some groups of employees and not others. 113 They
are probably correct on this point.114 I do not think the probability of their
winning such lawsuits means, however, that they should adopt a bargaining
strategy of making distinctions among groups of employees within a bargaining
unit regarding sale of the right to permanently replace.
To differentiate among employees regarding sale of the right to
permanently replace would be extremely divisive, splintering the bargaining
unit and setting it at war against itself. Of course, unions now negotiate for
different rates of pay and other differences in terms and conditions for different
groups of employees within bargaining units. But to do so with permanent
replacement would be different. This entitlement involves matters of job
security and ability to strike.115
IV. CONCLUSION
I agree with Professors Bierman and Gely that the law on striker
replacement should be reformed. I disagree, however, with the initial step of
their proposal-taking Employer's gun from him. While that step would
prevent Employer from shooting Union's people, it also might tempt Union to
113 Bierman & Gely, supra note 25, at 391-93.
114 Supreme Court has held that, when evaluating a union's performance in
negotiations, the Court must be "highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that
negotiators need for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities." Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
115 Consider organized labor's opposition to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). The Supreme Court held that an employer
did not violate the Railway Labor Act by refusing, at the conclusion of a strike, to replace
junior strike crossovers with more senior employees who did not cross over. Id. at 432. The
case illustrates a differentiation among the rights of bargaining unit members which pits
members against each other on job security, and by creating such rifts, impinges on a
union's ability to conduct a successful strike. The decision is so vehemently opposed by
organized labor that it, along with Mackay, would have been overturned by the Workplace
Fairness Act. H.R. REP. No. 116, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 2, 39 (1993).
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shoot Employer, and Bierman and Gely do not explain how their law would
prevent that. They do not recognize that there already are several laws that
discourage Employer from shooting up the town and that some other laws can
be made which would further discourage Employer without taking his gun and
leaving him at the mercy of Union. Bierman and Gely are confident that Union
would not shoot Employer. I think that is a naive view of how the two old
gunslingers are likely to act.
Bierman and Gely think that Union would negotiate with Employer about
selling back his gun to him. They do not appreciate Union's apprehension
about explaining to his people why he sold the gun back to Employer. Besides,
if Union sells it back to him, Union and his people can expect Employer to
come to the next meeting with it loaded.
Finally, Union cannot bargain with Employer the way Bierman and Gely
want him to. If he did, his people would turn on each other, and when he
needed them to fight with Employer, many of them would not be willing to put
their lives on the line. And who could blame them if Union were willing to
sacrifice some of them?
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